Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 4

Issue 3

Article 8

1915

The Right of Privacy
L. Meriwether Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Privacy Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Smith, L. Meriwether (1915) "The Right of Privacy," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 4: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol4/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

22

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

tion involved in this controversy within the operation of the WebbKenyon law, and divest it of the protection of the commerce clause
of the Constitution, the court would have to presume, without proof,
that the bo6k which Porter requested to see contained a record of
shipments of liquor intended to be received, possessed, sold, or in
some manner used in violation of the law of Kentucky. But, under
well established principles of law, the contrary presumption must
prevail in the absence of proof, and there is no proof here as to the
character of the shipment. * * *
"It follows, therefore, * * * that the shipmnets in question
must be treated as if they were lawful, and, consequently, fully invested with the protection afforded to inter-state commerce by the
commerce clause of the Constitution; and, that the agent of the express company could not lawfully disclose, to a private citizen, any
information concerning said shipments, except with the consent of the
consignor and the consignee."
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY.
As Illustrated by the Case of Col. Jack Chinn v. Foster-Milburn Co.

By L. MERIWETHER SmITH, HARRODSBURG BAR.

In the early part of January, 19o7, the town of Harrodsburg,
Kentucky, was flooded with a patent medicine circular, called Doan's
Directory, published by the Foster-Milburn Company, of Buffalo, N.
Y., for the purpose of advertising a nostrum known as Doan's Kidney Pills. The circular contained the pictures and letters of a number of more or less prominent people, all of whom were represented
by singing the praises of Doan's Kidney Pills. Amid this galaxy of
celebrities appeared the picture of Col. Jack Chinn, and a letter purporting to have been written by him, in which he is made to say,
after recounting his ailments and suffering: "A few boxes of pills
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effectually rounted the ailment and I am glad to acknowledge the
benefit I have derived."
Harrodsburg is not a large place and Col. Chinn is perhaps
known by every man, woman and child within its bounds. So the
next time the Colonel drove into town from his blue grass farm, after
the distribution of the circular, he was assailed on all sides by the
jokes and gibes of his many acquaintances. Some wanted to know
how much he got; others asked him how his poor back was feeling;
and some credulous ones began to buy the pills in the hope that they
might have powerful backs like Clo. Jack's. Letters were written
him, he received many telephone calls in regard to the remedy he was
represented as so highly recommending.
Col. Chinn was indignant at the liberty that had been taken with
him and smarting under the raillery of his friends and the insinuations that he had been paid for the recommendation by those who
were not his friends, he sought a lawyer to inquire as to whether
there was any redress for the taking of such undue liberty with the
picture and name of a man.
His lawyer thought that there must be some way of righting
such an obvious wrong, but a careful search of the Kentucky Statutes
and the Kentucky Reports failed to reveal to himthe remedy sought;
it appearing that no like case had lever been brought before the
courts of Kentucky.
The Right of Privacy was first discussed in this country in a
very able article written by Louis A. Brandies, now a lawyer of
national reputation, which appeared in i89o in the Harvard Law Review, 193. This article was simply a discussion of the Right of
Privacy as an abstract proposition; a little later in the case of Robinson vs. Rochester Folding Box Co., i7i N. Y. 538, this right was
invoked by the plaintiff with the result that the Right of Privacy was
held as non-existent by a divided court, three of the seven judges dissenting in an able and unanswerable opinion.
The opinion of the majority of the court in this case is based
wholly upon the contention that as no precedent could be found in
the common law decisions for such an action, the law provides no
remedy for the invasion of the Right of Privacy. It conceives the
common law to be designed only to meet the needs of its original
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propounders, and that what they failed to do, can not be done, and
that the needs of our ever advancing civilization can be met only by
Statutory enactments.
The fallacy of this line of reasoning should be apparent to even
the tyro. The common law is defined in 8 Cyc. 368, as follows:
"The unwritten, or common law, as distinguished from the written or
Statute laws", is the embodiment of principles and rules inspired by
natural reasons, and innate sense of justice and the dictates of convenience, and voluntarily adopted by men for their government in
social relations. The common law is not fixed and immutable except
by positive enactment, like the Statute law, but is flexible, so that it is
always adopted to meet new and unexpected conditions and so its
principles will cease to apply when the reasons on which they are
founded ceases."
In Jacob vs. The State, 3 .Humlih., (Tenn.) 493, the Court says:
"The common law has been aptly called lex non scripta, because it is
a rule prescribed by common consent and agreement of the community, as one applicable to its different relations, and capable of
preserving the peace, good order and harmony of society and rendering unto every one, that which of right belongs to him. It's seat is
in the breasts of the judges who are its expositors and expounders."
There are many early English cases in which injunctions have
been granted to plaintiffs to prevent the further publication of letters
and photographs, where the publication was unauthorized, but these
cases are based upon a supposed property right. However., there are
several more recent decisions from the English Courts which sustain
the right of the individual to an inviolate privacy. In the case of
Pavesich vs. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, the. facts are
very similar to those of the Chinn case.
Without the knowledge or consent of the complainant his picture
was published in two forms, one expressing great dejection and the
other extreme happiness, the cuts were set up side by side, below was
the statement that his unhappy condition was changed to the happy
one by having taken out a policy in this company.
An action was instituted by the complainant to restrain the publication of the pictures and printed statement and for damages. The
injunction was granted and heavy damages awarded. The conclud-
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ing paragraph of the opinion of the Court, in which all of the justices
concur, is as follows: "So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law
recognizes within proper limits as a legal right, the Right of Privacy,
and that the publication of one's picture without his consent, by
another, as an advertisement for the mere purpose of increasing -the
profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that
we venture to predict that the day will come that the American bar
will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of
eminence and ability, just as in the present day we stand amazed that
Lord Coke should have combatted, with all the force of his vigorous
nature, the proposition that the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction
to entertain an application for injunction to restrain the enforcement
of a common law judgment, which had been obtained by fraud, and
that Lord Hale, with perfect composure of manner, and complete satisfaction of soul, imposed the death penalty for witch-craft upon
ignorant and harmless women." Lord Coke was unquestionably
wrong in his contention referred to by the Georgia Court, but it is
highly probable that he would have held the Right of Privacy to be
good law, for he was fond of the expression: "The right to be let
alone," which right he held should be enjoyed by evrey citizen. But
in the day of good Lord Coke conditions did not exist under which
a case similar to the one under consideration could arise. Our ever
changing conditions demand that the common law keep step with the
progressive spirit of our times.. To quote from the Brandies article
referred to above, "That the individual shall have full protection in
person and property is a principle as old as the common law, but it
has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact
nature and extent of such protection.
Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law in its eternal youth grows to meet
the demand of society. The development of the law was inevitable.
The intense intellectual and emotional life in the heightening of sensation which came with the advance of civilization made it clear to
men that only a part of the pain, pleasure and profit of life lay i
physical things.
Thoughts, emotions and sensations demanded legal recognition,
and the beautiful capacity of growth which characterizes the common
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law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection without the
interposition of the legislature."
And so the Kentucky Court of Appeals, keeping abreast of the
times, has upheld the Right of Privacy in the case of Foster-Milburn
Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364, in the following language:
"While there is some conflict in the authorities, we concur with those
holding that a person is entitled to the Right of Privacy as to his picture, and that the publication of the picture of a person without his
consdnt, as a part of an advertisement for the purpose of exploiting
the publisher's business, is a violation of the Right of Privacy, and
entitled him to recover without proof of special damages."
For final adjudication see 137 Ky. 843, 127 S. W. 476. The Foster-Milburn Company refusing to pay the judgment awarded by the
Kentucky Courts. Suit was brought in the Federal Court at Buffalo, N. Y., which Court sustained the Kentucky Courts, 195 Fed.
158. Thereupon the defendant took an appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals at Albany, N. Y., where the judgment was again upheld,
and the Foster-Milburn Co. was compelled to pay the judgment of
the Court below. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 202 Fed. 175.
Again the common law has scored a triumph, nor is it unreasonable to believe that a hundred years hence, when conditions shall
exist never conceived by even the matchless imagination of Jules
Verne, the common law, "eternal in its youth," will still be adequate
to furnish relief for wrongs undreamed of by this generation.

